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Abstract: The latest US-led coalition’s attacks against ISIS in Syria raised the question whether 
states can use defensive force against non-state actors. Two critical incidents had previously 
triggered the discussion on the importance and consequences of cyber-attacks as a new form 
armed attacks. The first one occurred in Estonia in 2007, when the country experienced extensive 
computer hacking attacks that lasted several weeks. The second incident happened in 2008, during 
the Georgia–Russia conflict over South Ossetia, when Georgia experienced cyber-attacks similar 
to those suffered by Estonia in the previous year. Furthermore, on June 21, 2016, the central banks 
of Indonesia and South Korea were hit by cyber-attacks on their public websites since activist 
hacking group Anonymous pledged last month to target banks across the world. 
The previous incidents have created, once again, public questioning if the rules on the use of force 
and the right of self-defense established in the United Nations Charter are sufficient and efficient 
to address these new forms of attacks.   
Key words: Self-defense, United Nations, Pre-emptive Self-defense, non-state actors, cyber-
attacks 
Resumen: Los últimos ataques de la coalición liderada por Estados Unidos en contra de ISIS en Siria plantearon 
la cuestión de si los Estados pueden usar la autodefensa contra agentes-no-estatales. Dos incidentes críticos ya habían 
provocado la discusión sobre la importancia y las consecuencias de los ataques cibernéticos como una nueva forma de 
ataques armados. La primera tuvo lugar en Estonia en 2007, cuando el país experimentó ataques de piratas 
informáticos por varias semanas. El segundo incidente ocurrió en 2008, durante el conflicto entre Georgia y Rusia 
por Osetia del Sur, cuando Georgia, experimentó ataques cibernéticos similares a los sufridos por Estonia en el año 
anterior. Además, el 21 de junio el año 2016 los bancos centrales de Indonesia y Corea del Sur se vieron afectados 
por los ataques cibernéticos en sus sitios web por parte del grupo activista de hackers denominado ¨Anónimos.  
                                                          
1  Artículo enviado el 20.09.2016 y aceptado el 18.01.2017. 
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Los incidentes mencionados han creado, una vez más, el cuestionamiento público si las normas sobre el uso de la 
fuerza y el derecho a la legítima defensa establecido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas son eficientes y eficaces para 
hacer frente a estas nuevas formas de ataques. 
Palabras claves: Legítima defensa, Naciones Unidas, legítima defensa preventiva, actores no estatales, 
ciberataques.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
This essay will explain that the rules on the prohibition of the use of force established in Articles 
2(4), 42 and 51 of the United Nations Charter (UNCH) are in fact outdated to address conflicts 
in the 21st century. About this, it will be demonstrated that what is outdated are the rules about 
self-defense in cases of armed attacks by non-state actors like, for example, ISIL. The present 
essay will first develop the general requirements detailed in the United Nations Charter for the 
use of force in case of an armed attack and how they have been used by nations to address 
conflicts. In the second section, it will be analyzed the application of the principle of self-defense 
as the exception to the prohibition of the use of force. The third section will address the 
consideration of anticipatory self-defense. In the fourth section, I will discuss the shift in 
development since the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America, especially the doctrine of 
pre-emptive self-defense proposed by the United States of America. Finally, I will explain how 
21st-century terrorist attacks have forced to extend the scope of application of the rules of the 
United Nations Charter because the traditional understanding of both state actors and armed 
attack have changed. On the one hand, during the last decade, not only states but also non-state 
actors have launched attacks from their states to other states. On the other, the traditional 
understanding of armed attack is not currently supportive of multiple and technological attacks 
from hackers or non-states actors to states by means different from those who usually destroy 
physical assets.   
 
2. The general rules of the prohibition of the use of force under the United 
Nations Charter 
 
In this section, I will address two main issues. The first aspect to analyze is to understand which 
is the prohibition’s scope if it involves the threat of use of force, the use of force or both. In the 
second term, I will analyze if the prohibition is absolute or relative, that is, if the use of force is 
allowed or not when is consistent with the purposes of the United Nations Charter. 
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The general prohibition of the use of force is a treaty-based rule established in the United 
Nations Charter (from now on "UNCH") and a rule of customary law that has evolved 
particularly in recent years.2 It is a treaty-based rule because it is recognized in the United Nations 
Charter, but at the same time is accepted as being representative of customary international law 
in the terms expressed by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Nicaragua case.3   
Article 2(4) of the UNCH express that members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (UN). The article 
reflects the idea that all UN members must abstain from the use of force in their international 
relations and the threat of the use of force against 1) territorial integrity or 2) political 
independence of any State.   
Furthermore, the prohibition of Article 2(4) has two faces, first, to threat the use of force, and 
second, to the use of force. In this sense, the International Court of Justice (from now on ICJ) 
in both the Nicaragua case and the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons concluded that 
a threat of force is unlawful where the actual use of the force threatened would be itself illegal.4 
The pronouncement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case is of extreme importance. Regarding the 
interpretation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, it has established that not only the 
laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters and attacks on Nicaraguan ports and oil installations by 
United States forces but also the support for the opposition forces (the Contras) engaged in 
forcible struggle against the government, could constitute a use of force. Even more, the army 
and training of the Contras involved an unlawful use of force against Nicaragua.5  
On the other hand, in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ held that a 
threat of force is unlawful where the actual use of the force threatened would be itself unlawful, 
then refusing to find that mere possession of nuclear weapons was an unlawful threat of force.6 
Until 1970 there was a discussion whether economic coercion was considered a threat of the use 
of force or not. However, the UN General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970 
settled this discussion, and now there is a broad understanding that economic coercion is 
expressly prohibited.7  
In the second term, I will now analyze if the prohibition is absolute or relative, that is if the 
prohibition is total or can be interpreted to allow the use of force for actions according to the 
                                                          
2  Olivier Corten, “The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate”, The 
European Journal of International Law 16, n° 5 (2006): 803. 
3  Christine Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, in International Law, 4th Ed., ed. Malcolm Evans 
(Oxford: OUP, 2014), 620. 
4  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 621. 
5  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), 
1981 I.C.J., 14 ICJ Reports 1986 (International Court of Justice 1986). 
6  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 621. 
7  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 621. 
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purposes of the UNCH. The purposes of the United Nations are detailed in Article 1 of the 
Charter in order to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. In consequence, 
what needs to be analyzed is if the use of force is allowed when consistent with the mentioned 
purposes.    
An absolute interpretation can be found in Olivier Corten´s research. He has explained that it is 
necessary to consider articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter to obtain a text-oriented 
interpretation, according to the rules of sections 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.8 Corten addressed his arguments to understand that, because the United 
Nations Charter is a treaty itself, it should be governed and interpreted by the rules of the Vienna 
Convention; especially, the interpreter must apply the rules for interpretation provided in 
Articles 31 and 31. Following those standards, the Charter should be interpreted in good faith 
by the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and the light of 
its object and purpose.   
In other words, according to the text, the context and the purposes of the Charter previously 
explained, the use of force is only allowed when is consistent with the United Nations Charter: 
that is, in the case of self-defense, the major exception to the general prohibition. 
On the other hand, a relative interpretation, which is to consider the use of force outside of the 
scope of the Charter, has remained exceptional even when there is some discussion about the 
extent of it as it is reflected in cases of use of force in pursuit of self-determination or the use in 
pursuit of democracy.9  There is a minority opinion by D´Amato that the use of force to restore 
democratic governments is not prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter.10 However, this view 
has not been considered by states.    
The conclusion of this section is that the prohibition of the use of force relates to both the threat 
and use; an absolute interpretation of the prohibition seems to be the right one, as it is with the 
text, context, and purposes of the Charter. Finally, a relative application of the principle should 
remain under consideration for exceptional discussion and only for the mentioned cases.  
The following section will now address the right to self-defense as the primary exception to the 
general rule of prohibition of the use of force.  
                                                          
8  Olivier Corten, “The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate”, 
813. 
9  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 623. 
10  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 623. 
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3. The right to self-defense 
 
The main exception to the prohibition of the use of force is established in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. It expresses that nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Actions taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the Chart to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.11  
The scope of the provision is controversial as to understand if the right to self-defense of Article 
51 is exhaustive or, on the contrary, there is a wider customary right that goes beyond the right 
to respond to an armed attack.12 A restrictive interpretation of the right to self-defense is based 
on the text of Article 51 of the Charter; as the provision establishes a restriction on the right to 
self-defense in response to armed attacks, it seems complicated to preserve a wider right, 
unlimited by the limitations of Article 51. Also, the right of self-defense is in itself an exception 
to the principle of the use of force, in consequence, it should be analyzed narrowly. A broad 
interpretation as to anticipatory self-defense and the necessity of imminent attack will be 
explained in the following section.  
The scope of the right to self-defense cannot be found in Article 51. Nevertheless, self-defense 
is part of the corpus of customary international law. It is agreed that it must be necessary and 
proportionated.13 The scope of the right has been recognized in several decisions by the ICJ such 
as the Nicaragua case.14 The ICJ adopted a restrictive view of the right of self-defense, although it 
expressly left open the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense. The Court recognized 
that a separate customary international law right of self-defense continues to exist alongside 
Article 51 of the Charter, but concluded that an armed attack was a pre-condition underpinning 
both sources.15  
Furthermore, the definition of armed attack cannot be found in the UNCH, and it is also a 
construction of customary international law.16 The definition traditionally recognizes as armed 
attack the one performed by a regular army of one state to the territory of another. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
11  United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations." 
12  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 628. 
13  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 628. 
14  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), 
1981 I.C.J., 14 ICJ Reports 1986 (International Court of Justice 1986). 
15  Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “Self-Defence against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World”, Queensland University of Technology 
Law & Justice Journal 4, n° 2 (2004): 3.   
16  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 628. 
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the concept extends beyond attacks by regular forces, also covering attacks by armed bands, 
irregulars, and mercenaries.17 It is responsible for saying that this interpretation seems to be 
accurate because it can cover not only attacks from one state to another but also armed attacks 
from militant groups from one state to another state, armed attacks within the boundaries of a 
state. Other interpretation would probably be restrictive. 
It is clear is that the right to self-defense requires of an armed attack and that the response from 
the attacked state needs to be necessary and proportionate. However, a question is raised 
regarding an armed attack: should states wait until the attack is launched, or is there any 
international rule to prevent the attack in cases of the imminence of use of force? This discussion 
will be addressed in the next section.   
To summarize the previous part, the present essay has provided grounds to acknowledge that it 
is unquestionable that the right to self-defense is the core exception to the use of force under 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Likewise, it is also evident that both the scope of 
the right of self-defense and the definition of armed attack are constructions from customary 
international law and not sourced in treaty-based rules. Finally, it is necessary to remark that the 
primary concern is to determine whether the right to self-defense requires an attack that is being 
committed or the right to defend is also applicable in cases of imminent attacks. The latter will 
be developed in the next segment of this essay. 
 
4. Anticipatory self-defense 
 
In this section, I will highlight the importance of the discussion whether Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter provides a limited exercise of the right of self-defense or if it should consider a 
wider application of it. Professor Christine Gray has explained that a major controversy of the 
scope of the right to self-defense was the idea of a right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-
defense.18 She asks if the right to self-defense only arise after an armed attack has started under 
Article 51 or if there is a wider right to anticipate an imminent attack.19  
The source of the discussion comes from the reading of Article 51. The Charter as a treaty does 
recognize the right to self-defense but not the right to an anticipatory self-defense, and the UN 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression and Declaration on Friendly Relations neither do so. 
Therefore, it is necessary to ask the question whether is there a rule of customary law about it? 
                                                          
17  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 629. 
18  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 630. 
19  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 630. 
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Following Professor Van den hole, the question has a straightforward answer: yes, and the 
grounds for the development can be found in the Caroline case.20 
The Caroline case was an incident occurred in the first part of the nineteenth century when the 
anti-British insurrection was taking place in Canada. At the time, Canada was under British 
control while the United States of America and The United Kingdom were in an apparent state 
of peace. There was a vessel owned by U.S. nationals, the Caroline, that was allegedly aiding the 
rebels in Canada. On December 29, 1837, while the ship was on the U.S. side of the Niagara 
River, British troops crossed the river, boarded the ship, killed several U.S. nationals, set the ship 
on fire, and sent the vessel over Niagara Falls. The British claimed that they were acting in self-
defense, but after some heated exchanges with Secretary of State Daniel Webster, the British 
government ultimately apologized. The fundamental characteristics of the anticipatory self-
defense principle were developed from this case: necessity and proportionality.21  
Professor Van den hole has explained that the preconditions set in the Caroline case, necessity 
and proportionality, have been extended to the right of anticipatory self-defense in the form of 
general rule of customary international law.22 The conditions for the application of anticipatory 
self-defense requires a threat that is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means nor 
moment for deliberation. Furthermore, what the Caroline incident and its following doctrinal 
analysis had established is that there is an important distinction that requires being understood, 
that is the imminence of the attack. While the right to self-defense demands the attack being 
launched, the right to anticipatory self-defense can prevent the attack if the conditions for its 
application are fulfilled.  
It is important to remark that states like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and 
Israel have claimed a broad right to self-defense in the terms previously exposed. However, the 
doctrine is highly controversial that the right has rarely been practiced.23 
As it was explained, this is a controversial issue and remains contested by different states. 
Furthermore, there is a discussion whether the Caroline test is enough to prevent an armed attack 
or it is necessary a broader analysis that considers that an imminent threat is configured when 
any further delay would result in an inability by the vulnerable state to defend itself against or 
avert the attack against it.24 Finally, as a reflect of the controversy, the ICJ deliberately left this 
analysis unresolved in the Nicaragua case and the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.25  
                                                          
20  Leo Van den hole, “Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law”, American University International Law Review 19, n° 
1 (2003): 95. 
21  Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Military Force”, The Washington Quarterly 26, n° 2 (Spring 
2003): 90. 
22  Van den hole, “Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law”, 97. 
23  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 630. 
24  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 631. 
25  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 630. 
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Up to this point, this essay has explained the regulation of the provision for the use or the threat 
of the use of force under the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, it has also provided 
information regarding the principal exemption to the utilization of the force; that is the right to 
self-defense. Likewise, I have provided arguments to understand that this is not a simple issue, 
on the contrary, it is a complex and highly contested one. Following these ideas, this paper has 
also presented evidence about the discussion of a broad understanding of the right to self-
defense regarding the anticipatory self-defense doctrine. The Caroline case in the 19th century was 
the cornerstone for the developing of the theory: it demanded that the attack should be imminent 
and not necessarily launched to prevent it. Once the conditions of the doctrine were fulfilled, a 
state can respond in a proportionated way to exercise its right to self-defense. This is important 
to remark: the response to an attack or an imminent attack should always be proportioned to 
the attack or the imminence of attack. Otherwise, the proportionality condition of the right to 
self-defense is not verified and therefore escapes from the scope of the right under the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.  
As it was explained, an imminent attack is the core condition for the application of anticipatory 
self-defense. Nevertheless, this topic is still an under constant discussion and analysis by states.  
The exercise of the right to self-defense in case of the use or threat of use of the force has been 
traditionally studied when a state-actor attacks or threatens to attack another state-actor. It is not 
difficult to find examples of this attacks, in 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, the 1950´s Vietnam War, 
the 1950´s North Korean invasion of South Korea, among others. However, since the last 
decade or so conventional or traditional attacks from one state are no longer the general rules. 
Since the attack the United States of America suffered on September 11, 2001, new actors have 
raised: non-state actors. The importance and, in particular, the consequences of their actions 
have created awareness if the rules for self-defense or anticipatory self-defense established in the 
United Nations Charter can address this attacks. In other words, has the United Nations Charter 
and rules of customary international law the ability to provide adequate answers to non-state 
actors attacks? 
The next two sections of this essay will present solid arguments to conclude that the provisions 
of the Charter are outdated and insufficient to deal with non-state actors attacks. I will address 
that the definition for attacking state and armed attack are both inadequate and outdated to 
address current problems like attacks from non-state actors, such as IS/ISIS and cyber-attacks, 
whether they come from state or non-state actors.  
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5. The impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the right to self-defense. A right 
to a pre-emptive self-defense? 
 
The facts, causes, and consequences of the 9/11 attacks have been extensively studied and 
explained. Therefore, this essay would not consider those issues in detail. 
Attacks from terrorist groups as an example of non-state actors are by no means a new form of 
conflict. One of the first ones occurred in October 1985, when Israel bombed the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. The second major incident took place 
in April 1986 when the United States attacked Libyan government facilities in Tripoli following 
a terrorist attack on a Berlin nightclub.26 The third incident was when the United States used 
force to respond to terrorism when it fired cruise missiles at Iraq in 1993, following the discovery 
of a plot to assassinate former President George H. Bush while in Kuwait.27 The final significant 
incident before 9/11 occurred in 1998 when the United States attacked an Al-Qaida terrorist 
training camp in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons factory in Sudan.28  
It is important to highlight that, despite the fact that the attacks were committed by non-state 
actors, the common characteristic among them is that they were less likely to satisfy the threshold 
of an armed attack than the 9/11 attacks. At this point is necessary to remind that the definition 
of armed attack is not provided by the United Nations Charter and is a rule of customary 
international law. A significant consequence of this is that the concept requires being updated 
to satisfy current forms of attack. Nevertheless, September 11, 2001, marked a shift towards new 
considerations to address the conflict of armed attacks from non-state actors. 
A new reality was conceived from the 9/11 attacks; non-state actors are capable of projecting 
extreme violence across the globe. The September 11 attackers were a variety of individuals 
trained and recruited across different states, which were instructed and funded by a terrorist 
organisation named Al-Qaeda. This group had acquired the means to launch vicious attacks that 
within a matter of hours killed more than three thousand people, mostly civilians.29 
The attack the United States suffered from the terrorist group Al-Qaeda raised new 
considerations regarding the use of force as the mean to respond to armed attacks. One of the 
considerations was the creation of the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. 
                                                          
26  C. Greenwood, “International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya”, West Virginia Law Review 89 
(1987): 933. 
27  D. Kritsiotis, “The Legality of the 1993 US Missile Strike on Iraq and the Right of Self-Defence in International Law”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1996): 162. 
28  Garwood-Gowers, “Self-Defence against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World”, 10. 
29  Sean D. Murphy, “The Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence”, Villanova Law Review School of Law Digital Repository 50, n° 3 
(2005): 699.  
Are the rules for the right to self-defense outdated to address current conflicts? 
Gonzalo J. Arias 
 
 
 
Número de página no utilizable para citar 
 
10/19 
 
Professors Reisman and Armstrong have provided a definition of this doctrine. Pre-emptive 
self-defense is a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without previous or international 
authorization, high levels of violence to stop an incipient development that is not yet operational 
or directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be seen by the potential attacked-
state as susceptible to neutralization only at a higher and possible unacceptable cost to itself.30 
One can see the main difference between the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense and pre-
emptive self-defense. While the former demands the existence of an imminent attack to be 
launched, the latter excludes that condition for the application of the right to self-defense. 
The discussion of this issue was not a simple one. Even when the theory first was developed by 
the United States of America post-September, 11 attacks the discussion was strictly followed in 
the United Kingdom. As Daniel Bethlehem explains, the UK House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee expressed that the idea of imminence should be reconsidered in light of new 
threats to international peace and security regardless if pre-emptive self-defense is a new legal 
creation31. However, despite the UK support to the US interpretation, the theory has not been 
internationally agreed, yet.  
 
Following the previous idea, I am of the opinion that the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense 
appears to be a far too broad interpretation and application of the traditional concept of the 
right to self-defense. On the one hand, there is no requirement for a proportionated response. 
On the other, it does not consider the imminence of the attack. It is precisely the absence of 
those two conditions that make this interpretation both dangerous and unlimited. First, a state 
might consider the right to a pre-emptive self-defense even when there is no proof of a possible 
attack whatsoever. Secondly, if it is unlimited, there could be no restrictions for a state to claim 
the right how many times it deems as necessary. Finally, the application of the extensive 
interpretation of the right may lead us to revive a warfare environment similar to the Cold War. 
Following Reisman and Armstrong, Professor Donald Rothwell asked the next question, was 
international law adequate to deal with the threats posed by terrorist organizations or was there 
a need for new responses?.32 He further explains that what is in stakes is the capacity of 
international law to respond to new scenarios, like terrorist attacks.33 In other words, the current 
discussion is if states have the right to take actions against non-state actors even when there is 
                                                          
30  W. Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, “The Past and Future of the Claim of Pre-emptive Self-Defence”, Yale Law 
School Legal Scholarship Repository 100, n° 525 (2006): 526.  
31.   Daniel Bethlehem, ¨Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defence Against an Imminent or Actual 
Armed Attack by Non-State Actors¨, The American Journal of International Law 106 (2012): 2. 
32  Donald Rothwell, “Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International Terrorism Special Edition: The United Nations 
and International Legal Order”, University of Queensland Journal 24, n° 2 (2005): 344.  
33  Rothwell, “Anticipatory Self-Defence”, 334. 
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no imminent attack from them. This problem is not of an easy solution; on the contrary, it is 
highly complex and debatable.    
Reisman and Armstrong have further explained that attacks like 9/11 have moved the 
international scenario from an actual armed attack as the requisite threshold of reactive self-
defense to the palpable and imminent threat of attack, which is the threshold of anticipatory 
self-defense. The doctrine has also shifted to the conjectural and contingent threat of the mere 
possibility of an attack at some future time, which is the threshold of pre-emptive self-defense, 
the self-assigned interpretive latitude of the unilateralist becomes wider. Finally, they said the 
nature and quantum of evidence that can satisfy the burden of proof resting on the unilateralist 
become less and less defined and is often, by the very character of the exercise, extrapolative and 
speculative.34 
Professor Andrew Garwood-Gowers has said that the post-9/11 right to use force in self-
defense against terrorism is subject to some limitations derived from the general conditions 
governing self-defense, namely the gravity threshold for an armed attack the need for an actual 
attack to have occurred, and the principles of necessity and proportionality.35 This means that 
even when the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense appears to be too broad to be applied, it still 
demands compliance of the traditional requirements of the right to self-defense. However, 
besides this, the issue remains controversial. 
The arguments presented by Professors Garwood-Gowers and Reisman and Armstrong reflect 
on the one hand the complexity of the evolution of the doctrine and on the other the necessity 
to adequate it to new and complex forms of attacks.  
From the previous explanations, is clear that the traditional doctrine of treaty-based self-defense 
and customary based anticipatory self-defense have demonstrated to be insufficient to protect 
and prevent states from new manifestations of the use of force. This has created the need for 
new mechanisms to use force as a tool for self-defense whether anticipatory or pre-emptive. A 
reflection of this need is the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. Under this construction, the 
US government proposed the elimination of the condition of the imminence of the armed attack 
to respond by using force against the attacking state. Besides being a proposal from the US, a 
UN High-level Panel of Experts firmly rejected this doctrine.36  
This reflects a shift to adequate the definition of the right to self-defense as the reaction to the 
use of force. The change obeys to two main issues, first to a wider understanding of armed 
attacks. Second to the consideration of attacks from non-state actors, both issues will be 
developed in the final section. 
                                                          
34  Reisman and Armstrong, “The Past and Future of the Claim of Pre-emptive Self-Defence”, 527. 
35  Garwood-Gowers, “Self-Defence against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World”, 14. 
36  Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order”, 634. 
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6. Why are the rules of the use of force outdated? The case of US-led 
coalition attacks against ISIS and cyber-attacks 
 
From the previous sections, it is possible to conclude that the scope of the use of force and the 
right to self-defense have shifted during history. Furthermore, the extent of the right and it´s 
interpretation and application has been moved not by the creation of new rules of international 
law, nor by customary regulations, they have extended the scope by the appearance of new 
international actors. New attackers and new forms of attack have caused debate whether the 
existing rules are enough to deal with issues like self-defense and the use of force. It is responsible 
for saying that the UNCH and the customary international law rules for the use of force and the 
right to self-defense (and anticipatory self-defense) are outdated and static.37 The definition for 
attacking state and armed attack are insufficient to address trending issues like attacks from non-
state actors and cyber-attacks.   
 
1.1 The case of US-led coalition attacks against ISIS (non-state actors) 
The United Nations Charter provisions lay down an aggressive regime of rules against force and 
states have considered the scheme to be too ambitious. However, these are rare instances, and 
in the clear majority of cases arguments about the legality of forcible conduct are tailored to fit 
the Charter regime.38 Nevertheless, this essay firmly believes that the rules must be reviewed and 
updated. The basis for the following construction is reflected in the US-led coalition attacks to 
ISIS in Syria and the research done by Professor Monica Hakimi.  
As a previous explanation, Operation Inherent Resolve is the name of the air campaign carried 
out by a Combined Joint Task Force of US-led coalition forces against the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant, ISIL. The terrorist group is at war with more than 60 nations or groups: coalition 
nations conducting airstrikes in Iraq include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; coalition countries conducting 
airstrikes in Syria include Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the 
United States.39 The particular characteristics of ISIS´s attacks can be found in the fact that for 
the first time a terrorist group as a non-state actor can recruit agents to form all around the globe 
                                                          
37  Christian Tams, “The Use of Force against Terrorists”, The European Journal of International Law 20, n° 2 (2009): 360. 
38  Tams, “The Use of Force against Terrorists”, 360. 
39  Federica D’Alessandra, “Jus and Bellum in Syria: The Meaning of the US Airpower Campaign”, Human Rights Law Working 
Group Newsletter (March 2015): 37.  
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and launch attacks to their own-state-territory and other states claiming their international 
recognition. 
Monica Hakimi has explained that the US-led coalition attacks against ISIL in Syria have again 
raised the question whether states can use defensive force (right to self-defense) against non-
state actors.40 This reflects a need for modern interpretation of the rules to be useful in the 
regulation of the use of force and self-defense from non-state actors.  However, the proper 
analysis on how to deal with these new players is still uncertain and contested.41 However, the 
thesis Hakimi presents is somehow limited because she provides a map of the positions that 
were plausible available when the US operations in Syria began to determine the application of 
self-defense. This is basically because the law in this area has been poorly settled and in 
consequence, there is broad legal reasoning that may be invoked. 
Hakimi further concluded that the case of US-led coalition attacks against ISIL reflects three 
main issues. First the fact that international law prohibits the use of defensive force against non-
state actors is losing terrain. Second, States for different reasons have decided not to assume a 
position on this matter. Finally, this ambivalence has created a substantial gap between the rules 
that are articulated as law and those who reflect operational practice.42  
Professor Paust has provided an interesting interpretation to address these issues and to 
acknowledge the right of both anticipatory and self-defense against non-state actors. Paust´s 
arguments are in the same line of thought than those presented by Professor Hakimi. He said 
the vast majority of writers agreed that an armed attack by non-state actors on a state could 
trigger the right of self-defense addressed in Article 51 of the UNCH.43 The grounds for his 
interpretation are in article 51 of the UNCH; nothing in the language restricts the right to engage 
in self-defense actions to circumstances of armed attacks by a state. Also, nothing in the language 
of the UNCH requires a conclusion that a state being attacked can only defend itself within its 
borders, he argues.44 Finally, by application of the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, Article 51 needs to be read by its literal meaning (no exclusion of non-state). Also, 
the context (Chapter VII, Acts of aggression) doesn't differentiate between state and non-state 
actors. Finally, by its object and purpose that is provide measures to restore peace.   
On the contrary, other authors like Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell have argued that States are 
restricted from using military force outside of self-defense or authorization from the Security 
Council. The right to use them must be found in the Jus ad Bellum, which would explicitly include 
the right of self-defense, and that significant military attacks are only lawful in the course of an 
armed conflict. For these reasons, she seems to be of the opinion that use of primary military 
                                                          
40  Monica Hakimi, “Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play”, International Law Studies 91 (2015) 3.  
41  Monica Hakimi, “Defensive Force against Non-State Actors”, 3 
42  Monica Hakimi, “Defensive Force against Non-State Actors”, 4. 
43  Jordan Paust, “Self-Defence Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan", Journal 
of Transnational Law and Policy 19, n° 2 (2010): 238.  
44  Paust, “Self-Defence Targetings of Non-State Actors”, 239. 
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force in response to a significant armed attack by a non-state actor outside the context of war 
should be unlawful. 45 
In other words, she has concluded that attacks from non-state actors cannot be considered to 
be under the scope of the exception of Article 51 of the Charter unless they can be categorised 
as to be in the context of war. However, this position seems to have little recognition among 
international lawyers and governments who would search for any legal, political or military 
grounds to exercise the right to self-defense against non-state actors. Finally, this issue is not of 
peaceful resolution and remains controverted. Nevertheless, O´Connell´s argument has a 
substantial flaw. She is the idea that only in the context of war a response to the attack of a non-
state actor is permissible. In other words, she left out of the discussion if the non-state actor 
performed the attack to a state o even if the non-state actor started a war. I firmly believe that 
this fundamental aspect cannot be taken out of the analysis. That is to say that if a non-state 
actor launches an attack on a state but it is not considered to be a war the attacked state cannot 
exercise a lawful right to self-defense? Furthermore, if a state has sufficient proof of an imminent 
attack from a non-state actor, it is not able to avoid it by anticipating it? These questions are by 
all means not easy to answer. However and taking into consideration Paust´s arguments there is 
no provision in the UNCH that has established the right to self-defense and even anticipatory 
self-defense only in cases of attacks from state actors. Another conclusion might lead us to open 
a door that could never be closed. 
The conclusion of this part is that attacks from non-state actors are not covered by the traditional 
provisions of the United Nations Charter nor by traditional rules of customary international law. 
However, latest attacks have demonstrated the necessity to adapt the rules and their 
interpretation with the sole purpose to address this kind of conflicts. The discussions Hakimi, 
Paust, D´Alessandra, and O´Connell, have presented are the core of the legal debate: are the 
Charter provisions outdated or are they useful to deal with these conflicts. 
 
1.2 Cyber-attacks 
“Cyber” is one of the most frequently used terms in international security discussions today. 
Thus, it is not a new term in international law. For several decades, international law’s specialists 
in the use of force have dedicated efforts towards understanding this problem and propose 
regulations. However, certain developments since at least 2007 have pushed the term and what 
it stands for to a top position on their agendas. The key issue is how to achieve security on the 
Internet by governments, organisations, and commercial interests when people want to have 
access to the Internet and all that it offers but not to be harmed by it.46  
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There are two critical incidents that triggered the discussion on the importance and 
consequences of cyber-attacks as a new form of attacks. The first one occurred in Estonia in 
2007, when the country experienced extensive computer hacking attacks that lasted several 
weeks. Cyber-attacks were launched targeting the country's infrastructure shutting down the 
websites of all government ministries, two major banks, and several political parties; hackers 
even disabled the parliamentary email server.47  
While the cyber-attacks on Estonia shocked the international community, they could have been 
far more devastating. In the future, hackers might target nation´s traffic lights, water supply, 
power grids, air traffic controls, or even its military weapon systems creating chaos, violence, 
and social unrest.48 Soon after the attacks on Estonia, North Atlantic Treaty Organization or 
NATO began developing policies and capacity aimed at cyber-security that was reflected in the 
Tallinn Manual explained in the following paragraphs. 
The second incident happened in 2008, during the Georgia–Russia conflict over South Ossetia, 
when Georgia experienced cyber-attacks similar to those suffered by Estonia in the previous 
year.49 The methods of cyber-attacks against Georgia primarily included websites and launch of 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) against numerous targets – methods like those used in 
attacks against Estonia in 2007. Among them were the National Bank and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Georgia.50  
As Professors Martin Stytz and Shelia Banks have explained, cyber-attacks can be used to control 
adversary´s information, target the portions of cyberspace used for situational awareness and 
decision-making, as well as lead the opponent to perform unwanted conducts. Furthermore, a 
cyber-attack diminishes both individual and collective situational awareness, command and 
control by undermining one or more elements of cyberspace.51 
The question one should ask is if a cyber-attack launched to a State´s banks or financial 
institutions or energy supply facilities or military assets, can be considered an armed attack under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? Can the impact of that cyber-attacks be measured in 
the same way of a traditional armed attack? Should the economic impacts be considered an 
armed attack? The importance of this new form of attacks from individuals or groups to a state 
is that they don't fit in the definition of armed attacks constructed by the rules of customary 
international law. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to acknowledge they are a reality that needs 
to be addressed. 
                                                          
47  Steven Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses”, Journal of Strategic 
Security 4, n° 2 (2011): 51.  
48  Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks, 2. 
49  O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War”, 188. 
50  “Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified” (Tallinn, Estonia: Cooperative Cyber Defence Center for 
Excellence, NATO, 2008).  
51  Martin Stytz and Sheila Banks, "Cyber Warfare Simulation to Prepare to Control CyberSpace", National Cybersecurity Institute 
Journal 1, n° 2 (2014): 9.  
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To understand the previous doubts, it is important to highlight Professor Zhxiong Huang´s 
research. He provides a clear interpretation on the rules for cyber-attacks. The focus, Huang 
says, should be on the legal attribution of cyber operations especially whether and how the rules 
on state attribution can be applied to these activities.52 In other words, what Huang presents is 
the core of the discussion: how and who attribute cyber-attacks. This is not an easy task; 
however, what it is clear is that the rules of the treaty-based United Nations Charter and the 
rules of customary international law are not able to provide a solution nor a guidance for this 
understanding. 
To reinforce the previous ideas, Professor Michael Schmitt has explained that one of the most 
complex challenges states can face in incidents of cyber-attacks is that the scope and manner of 
the rules of international law applicable have remained unsettled since their conception.53 In 
consequence, he emphasises, there is a high risk that cyber practice may quickly outdistance 
agreed understanding as to its governing legal regime.  
From the previously stated, it is of great importance to remark, once again, that the Charter rules 
are outdated and static to address an answer to this matter; the difficulty is to determine what 
rules can offer guidance to deal with these conflicts. As it was previously explained the rules of 
the use of force and the right to self-defense contained in both a treaty and in customary 
international standards, have demonstrated to be ineffective to address this problem. It is not 
difficult to see why: the Charter was agreed almost 70 years ago when conflicts like cyber-attacks 
were not even possible or plausible. Thus, rules of customary international law on the right of 
self-defense have adapted to new scenarios; for example, they have incorporated guidance for 
attacks from non-state actors and regulations for anticipatory self-defense. Even a discussion of 
a possible pre-emptive self-defense has been addressed. In this sense, there are two essential 
provisions to address cyber-attacks as the new means of aggression and both reflect well-
established customary rules of international law.54  
Before continuing it is necessary to make a prevention; the scope of these essay is to provide 
information and arguments to understand why the United Nations Charter provisions are 
outdated and unable to address attacks from non-state actors and cyber attacks. In consequence, 
even when the sets of regulations are presented to provide answers, they will not be dealt in 
depth because it will exceed the purpose of this paper. 
As it was announced, there are two main sets of rules. On the one hand, the International Law 
Commission’s work on state responsibility, also known as the Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), are adequate to address this problem.55 On 
                                                          
52  Zixiong Huang, “The Attribution Rules in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility: A Preliminary Assessment of Their 
Application to Cyber-Operations”, Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online 14, n° 1 (2014): 44.  
53  Michael Schmitt, “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare” (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).  
54  Huang, “The Attribution Rules in the ILC’s”, 45. 
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the other, the rules contained in the Tallinn Manual, especially Article 5 of control of cyber-
infrastructure, are also applicable.56  
The ARSIWA provisions had established a set of rules for the determination of the attribution 
of conduct to a State. In principle, conducts of private actors will not be attributed to a State 
unless it is directed or controlled by the State. Furthermore, the Articles set up three rules for 
particular situations. First, the conduct of a person or group of individuals carried out in the 
absence or default of the official authorities. Second, conducts of insurrectional or other 
movements. Finally, an act acknowledged and adopted by a State as it owns, that shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law.57  
The previous raises a fundamental question, are those rules for attribution updated and effective 
to determine State´s responsibility for non-state actors' cyber-attacks? This is a complicated task 
because these operations have unique particularities. .For example, hackers can easily hide their 
identity under IP tricks and even when cyber-attacks are readily available to non-state actors, 
most of them come from individuals.58 Furthermore, most cyber-attacks come from individuals 
rather than State, or State sponsored organisations. Thus, it is important to remark that a single 
actor can pose a devastating threat to a State through cyber-attacks.59  
Huang has reached the conclusion that the ARSIWA rules have played a key role to determine 
the attribution of a cyber-attack in a sense they fully apply to the rules of use of the force and 
the right to self-defense because they ensure responsible attribution.60  
The importance of this analysis is to recognise two core issues. First, the recognition that the 
traditional rules for the right to self-defense are outdated, ineffective and insufficient to deal with 
the complexity of cyber-attacks. Secondly, the rules of attribution presented in the ARSIWA 
Articles can be considered a step towards an appropriate regulation. However, the own structure 
of cyber-attacks should force the international community to be in constant awareness for new 
updates. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that it is crucial to bear in mind that the ARSIWA 
rules are a legal construction to determine state´s responsibility. They are a creation to try to 
solve the difficulties in attributing individual acts to a particular state. It is evident they have 
indeed reduced the risk of loopholes and legislation gaps, but they don´t solve the problem. As 
it was explained, the complexity of cyber attacks might pose an endless loop of determining 
responsibility to the extent of not being capable of it. Finally, it is clear that further regulations 
need to be developed to reduce the gap.   
The international rules on cyber warfare of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare, or simply the Tallinn Manual, can also be applied for the 
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determination of the attribution.61 In that sense, Article 5 of the Tallinn Manual provides that a 
State should not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its 
exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other 
States.62 The previous rules have recognised a standard of behavior regarding two types of 
infrastructure. First, to any infrastructure, whether is governmental or not, located on their 
territory. Secondly, infrastructure located elsewhere but over which the State has either de jure or 
de facto exclusive control.63 This is just the reflection of the well-understood principle of respect 
for the sovereignty of other States.   
Finally, on June 21, 2016, when this essay was being edited the central banks of Indonesia and 
South Korea were hit by cyber-attacks on their public websites since activist hacking group 
Anonymous pledged last month to target banks across the world. Thus there was no word on 
who the hackers were.64 According to the news agency Reuters, no money was lost during the 
attacks. 
This latest attack reflects once again a problematic reality: treaty-based and customary 
international rules for the right to self-defense are outdated, insufficient and inefficient to 
address this issues. Furthermore, they also acknowledge the need for major updates on the rules 
for a) attribution of the conduct, b) determination of State´s responsibility, c) exercise the right 
to self-defense. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
As it was explained, the rules of the use of force and right to self-defense are in fact outdated. 
This is reflected during the past decade through several terrorist attacks that have re-enforced 
the necessity of updating mechanism to address non-state actors and cyber-attacks.   
As it was explained, 21st-century terrorist attacks have forced to extend the scope of application 
of the rules of the United Nations Charter because the traditional understanding of both state 
actors and armed attack have changed. On the one hand, during the last decade, not only states 
but also non-state actors have launched attacks from their states to other states. On the other, 
the traditional understanding of armed attack is not currently supportive of multiple and 
technological attacks from hackers or non-states actors to states by means different from those 
traditionally used. This has led to creating rules for attribution, to determine international 
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responsibilities. Finally, even when strong arguments were presented to provide a position on 
how the United Nations Charter rules are outdated to address sophisticated and modern 
conflicts; the topic remains controversial and highly contested.   
 
 
 
 
 
